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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Vb. 
1 CACHE, L.L.C., GARY R. BRACKEN, 
and AARON BRACKEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Court of Appeal Case No. 2005 0181 CA 
District Court 
Case No. 040101608 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Section 
78-2a-3(j). Plaintiff may take appeal from a final order of dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. Utah Code Section 78-2-2. Plaintiff may take appeal from a final order granting 
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal, if said Motion was treated as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Utah Code Section 78-2-2. 
Plaintiffs complaint was filed in the First District Court, alleging breach of contract, and 
alleging that Defendant GARY BRACKEN and Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed an 
individual personal guarantee, in which Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN 
agreed to pay all amounts due and owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Plaintiffs complaint and 
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint further alleged that as a result of 1 CACHE, L.L.C. default 
on its open account agreement with Plaintiff, Defendant GARY BRACKEN and Defendant 
AARON BRACKEN were liable for a principle balance of $126,345.07. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
POINT I: Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's 
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Order of January 25, 2005, denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter an Order 
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, given that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact and Plaintiff established that: (1) Plaintiff/Appellant delivered both invoices and 
goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C.; (2) After subtracting all payments, the debt amount of $126,345.07 
is owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C., pursuant to the invoices and goods delivered; and (3) Defendants 
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee agreement, personally 
guaranteeing payment of all sums owed by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. on the open account? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents 
a question of law, which the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal 
Company v. Thavn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). The question of whether a contract is 
ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110 
P.3d 168, 172 (Utah App. 2005). Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has been a 
showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King International Inc. 17 P.3 
1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the district court's 
decision to deny summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district court's legal 
decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id 
POINT II: Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court Order 
of January 25, 2005, granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, given that there were 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON 
BRACKEN entered into, and breached a personal guarantee contract entered between Defendants 
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN, and Plaintiff DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has 
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been a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King International, 
Inc. 17 P.3 1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the district 
court's decision to grant summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district court's legal 
decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. 
POINT III: Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's 
Order of January 25, 2005, which, in effect, denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First 
Amended Complaint? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
amend, the appellate court will affirm the denial unless the trial court abused its discretion. 
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 
1998). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The full tests of the following determinative statutes are reproduced at Appendix A. 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12. 
B. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 
C. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a commercial collection case, governed by article II of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. See Utah Code Section 70A-2-101 et seq. (District Court File, pgs. 2 - 49) DBL 
DISTRIBUTING, Inc., sold electronic goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. on an open account. (District 
Court File, pgs. 2 - 49) The goods were invoiced and delivered to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. GARY 
BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee, which guaranteed that they 
would each pay the open account debt if 1 CACHE, L.L.C. defaulted. (District Court File, pgs. 2 
- 49) 1 CACHE, L.L.C. did not pay for the goods delivered and invoiced. (District Court File, 
pgs. 2 - 49) 1 CACHE, L.L.C. filed bankrupcty and received a discharge of the debt. Plaintiff 
DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., filed suit against GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN to 
obtain a judgment against them, individually, in the amount of $126,345.07. (District Court File, 
pgs. 2 - 49) 
B. Course of the Proceeding. 
On August 4, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant GARY BRACKEN 
alleging that Defendant GARY BRACKEN was liable for a principle balance of $126,345.07 in 
unpaid, outstanding invoices, which he personally guaranteed. (District Court File, pgs. 2 - 49) 
On August 26, 2004, Defendant GARY BRACKEN filed a Motion to Dismiss and 
Request for Sanctions and a Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities is support of the 
Motion to Dismiss. (District Court File, pgs. 50 - 52) In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant 
GARY BRACKEN asserted 1 CACHE, L.L.C. was a Utah Corporation which totally shield 
GARY R. BRACKEN from personal liability through the corporate shield. Further that, if 
GARY BRACKEN ever signed anything, it was only in his representative capacity as the 
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President of 1 CACHE, L.L.C., and he never personally guaranteed anything. (District Court 
File, pgs. 50-52) 
On August 30, 2004, Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and 
Request for Sanctions and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. 
(District Court File, pgs. 64 - 77). The Opposition attached the personal guarantees signed by 
GARY BRACKEN, as Exhibit B and C. (District Court File, pgs. 74 - 77). Plaintiffs Motion 
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint sought to drop 1 CACHE, L.L.C. as a party, and add 
AARON BRACKEN as a party, and was otherwise the same as the Complaint file on August 4th. 
On September 8, 2004, Defendant GARY BRACKEN filed the Affidavit of Gary R. 
Bracken, Defendant's Verified Reply Objection to Motion to Amend Complaint, and Request for 
Hearing. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 102). In his affidavit, (File pgs. 82-88) Defendant 
GARY BRACKEN admitted that he signed the Credit Application which was attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit 1. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 89, see pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, Exhibit 
1). The Exhibit 1 AGREEMENT, (pg. 86), provides in the last two sentences: "The 
undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to this 
Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a 
continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to creditor." (District 
Court File, pgs. 86, 97, 121) 
On September 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment and 
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (District Court File, pgs. 
103 -168). 
On September 30, 2004, Defendant GARY BRACKEN filed his Response Supporting 
Motion to Dismiss and Request for Sanctions, (District Court File, pgs. 169 - 172), his Verified 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, (District Court File, pgs. 173-181), Affidavit of Gary 
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Bracken (District Court File, pgs. 182 - 189), and Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, (District Court File, pgs. 190-191). 
On October 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed Notices to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint, for Decision. (District Court 
File, pgs. 192 - 195). On October 14, 2005, the Court set the matter for hearing on December 
13, 2004. (District Court File, pgs. 196-197) 
C. Course of Proceedings after the December 13, 2004 hearing. 
The Court heard argument from the parties on December 13, 2004 for about a half an 
hour, and took the matter under advisement. (District Court File, pg. 198, Hearing Transcript, 
2:1-21:15) 
On January 7, 2005, the Court filed its decision, entitled Memorandum of Decision. 
(District Court File, pgs. 199 - 202). Then, January 25, 2005, the Court entered an Order which 
denied Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted Defendant's Motion to dismiss the 
case against 1 CACHE, LLC, GARY R. BRACKEN, and AARON BRACKEN. (District Court 
File, pgs. 203 - 205). 
On February 17, 2005, Plaintiff/Appellant filed the Notice of Appeal, appealing the final 
ORDER entered on January 25, 2005. (District Court File, pgs. 210 - 211) 
SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
As Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment established, 1 
CACHE, L. C , entered an open account agreement with Plaintiff DBL DISTRIBUTING where 1 
CACHE, L. C. was able to purchase consumer electronic accessories, wholesale from DBL 
DISTRIBUTING. Plaintiff invoiced 1 CACHE, L.L.C., for the products ordered by 1 CACHE, 
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LX.C. and 1 CACHE, L.L.C., received delivery of the goods described on the invoices. 
Defendant 1 CACHE, L.L.C. was required to pay for the invoiced goods within thirty (30) days 
of the date that the goods were delivered and invoiced. (District Court File, pgs.l 15 - 168, see 
pg. 116,parag. 1,2) 
The Affidavit further established that, at the time the account was established, Defendant 
GARY R. BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee, which was attached as Exhibit A to the 
Plaintiffs Affidavit. (District Court File, pgs.l 15 - 168, see pg. 116, parag. 2 and pg. 121) 
The Affidavit of Gary Bracken established that the CREDIT APPLICATION 
AGREEMENT was signed by GARY BRACKEN on or about "01/26/99". (District Court File, 
pgs. 82 - 89, see pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, Exhibit 1). The language above Mr. GARY 
BRACKEN'S signature reads, "The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of 
all sums owed pursuant to this Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is 
intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to 
creditor." (See District Court File, pgs. 86, 97, 116 parag. 3, pg. 121, Hearing Transcript 8:19 -
9:23) 
Then, on April 24, 2001, Defendant GARY R. BRACKEN signed an additional agreement 
called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT" which states: 
"The undersigned agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to 
this Agreement and further Agree to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and 
is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to the 
creditor." (See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7, pgs. 87-88, 99, pg. 116 parag. 3, 
pg. 123) 
On the line for the signature, which starts "by: ", GARY 
BRACKEN signed his name. In the next line over, on the line 
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"TITLE: ", GARY BRACKEN, in his own handwriting wrote, 
"PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity". (See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7, 
pgs. 87-88, 99, 123) Defendant GARY BRACKEN argued at the December 13th hearing that by 
marking the TITLE line with the words, "PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity", that 
designation negated the above-stated language of the contract which provided for the "personal 
guarantee" of payment. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 89, Hearing Transcript, 15:17-17:19) 
At the December 13th hearing, Plaintiff argued that two contracts were entered into: One 
contract between DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., and 1 CACHE, L.L.C., in which GARY 
BRACKEN signed as President for 1 CACHE, L.L.C., and a second contract between the 
undersigned personal guarantor, GARY BRACKEN, and DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc. (Hearing 
Transcript, 6:6 - 12:2) Plaintiff further argued that second personal guarantee contract was not 
negated by Defendant GARY BRACKEN writing in the language on the TITLE line of the 
contract which stated, "PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity". (Hearing Transcript, 
6:6 - 12:2) 
The Plaintiffs Affidavit also established that Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed the 
same personal guarantee on July 18, 200L (District Court File, pgs. 116 parag. 4, pg. 125) No 
additional language was added after his signature. But, on the TITLE line, Mr. AARON 
BRACKEN designated his office with 1 CACHE, L.L.C as being, Vice President. (District 
Court File, pgs. 116 parag. 4, pg. 125) 
At the hearing held on December 13, 2004, on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary, Plaintiffs requested that the Court enter judgment against the 
Defendants AARON BRACKEN and GARY R. BRACKEN for the principle sum of 
$126,345.07, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $31,586.26, plus interest of 10 % per year 
starting from September 13, 2001, plus court costs incurred. (Hearing Transcript, 4:13 - 25) 
Defendants did not dispute the amounts requests, and the only defense put forward was 
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that no personal guarantee contract was entered between Defendants AARON BRACKEN and 
GARY BRACKEN, and Plaintiff DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 89, 
Hearing Transcript, 15:17- 18:22) 
THEREFORE, since a personal guarantee contract was entered into between the parties, 
the Court should summarily direct the District Court to enter judgment against Defendant GARY 
BRACKEN as requested by the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On or about January 26, 1999, Defendant GARY BRACKEN, the President of 1 CACHE, 
L.L.C., signed the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT which created an open account, 
where 1 CACHE, L.L.C. purchased electronic goods from DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc. The 
language directly above Mr. GARY BRACKEN'S signature stated that: 
"The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant 
to this Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be 
and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to 
creditor." 
Subsequently, DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., received goods from DBL DISTRIBUTING, 
Inc. After all payments are subtracted, 1 CACHE, L.L.C, owes DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., the 
amount of $126,345.07 resulting from the delivery of goods by DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., to 1 
CACHE, L.L.C. on the aforementioned open account. 
1 CACHE, L.L.C. filed chapter 7 Bankruptcy and discharged its obligation. Thus, DBL 
DISTRIBUTING, Inc., filed an action in district court to collect the balance owing against GARY 
BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN, the personal guarantors of 1 CACHE, L.L.C.'s obligation 
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to DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., on the open account. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment supported by an affidavit of the Plaintiff which established all of the necessary facts 
required for entry of judgment against GARY BRACKEN. Instead, the Court granted Defendant 
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN'S motion to dismiss, on the basis that Defendants 
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN did not personally guarantee the debt owing on the 
open account. 
This district court decision turned on the interpretation of the contractual language. 
However, the district court was wrong as a matter of law. Looking at the phrase: 
"The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant 
to this Agreement"... 
There is only one possible meaning to give to this phrase. That meaning makes GARY 
BRACKEN, who is the undersigned, personally liable for the charges placed on the open account, 
i.e. the unpaid invoices. Thus, this court should reverse the decision of the district court, and 
remand with instructions that the district court is to deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and 
grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's 
Order of January 25, 2005, denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter an Order 
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, given that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact and Plaintiff established that: (1) Plaintiff/Appellant delivered both invoices and 
goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C.; (2) After subtracting all payments, the debt amount of $126,345.07 
is owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C., pursuant to the invoices and goods delivered; and (3) Defendants 
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee agreement, personally 
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guaranteeing payment of all sums owed by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. on the open account? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents 
a question of law, which the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal 
Company v. Thavn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). The question of whether a contract is 
ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110 
P.3d 168, 172 (Utah App. 2005). Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has been a 
showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King International, Inc. 17 P.3 
1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the district court's 
decision to deny summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district court's legal 
decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." IdL 
A. The undisputed facts. 
Plaintiff established that 1 CACHE, L.L.C, received invoices from Plaintiff, for products 
ordered by 1 CACHE, L.L.C, and delivered to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Plaintiff further established 
that the total outstanding amount owed from goods ordered by and delivered to, 1 CACHE, 
L.L.C, was $126,345.07, owing since September 13, 2001. (District Court File, pgs. 117, parag. 
6) 
Plaintiff established that on or about 01/26/99, GARY BRACKEN signed a CREDIT 
APPLICATION AGREEMENT which, above the signature line, had the language, "The 
undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to this 
Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a 
continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to creditor." (See District 
Court File, pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 2, pg. 121, Hearing 
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Transcript 8:19-9:23) 
B. Personal Guarantee creating a contract between DBL Distributing, Inc., and 
Gary Bracken and Aaron Bracken. 
The key question in this case is: What is the meaning of the language of the CREDIT 
APPLICATION AGREEMENT? To interpret the full meaning of the CREDIT APPLICATION 
AGREEMENT, Defendant has put forward the Affidavit of Gary Bracken with extrinsic evidence 
about what he really intended when he sign the two different CREDIT APPLICATION 
AGREEMENTS. Defendant GARY BRACKEN argued before the district court that the 
CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT was a credit application for 1 CACHE, L.L.C., not for 
Gary Bracken himself. (Hearing Transcript, 15:17- 22) 
Although the district court may have relied on this extrinsic evidence, it is appellant's 
position that such evidence must be considered only in the proper context and in accordance with 
well-settled principles of contract interpretation. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110 P.3d 
168, 172 (Utah App. 2005). 
Plaintiff/Appellant argued before the district court that GARY BRACKEN'S signature 
created a second agreement between DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., and GARY BRACKEN which 
is a personal guarantee by the undersigned. (Hearing Transcript, 11:17- 25, 14:25 -15:6). 
When the parties to a contract disagree about the meaning of a provision, principles of 
contract interpretation require the Court to give effect to the meaning intended by the parties at 
the time they entered into the agreement. Central Florida Investment, Inc. v. Parkwest 
Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah App. 2002). A court may rely on extrinsic evidence only 
after it has determined that the provision is ambiguous. Neilsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600, 602 
(Utah 2003). Otherwise, when the agreement is unambiguous, the court must "determine the 
parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law. 
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Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 2004). 
It was and is Plaintiff/Appellant's position that the agreement is unambiguous. (Hearing 
Transcript, 6:12 - 7:4, 11:17 - 25, 14:3 - 15:6). 
When interpreting a contract, a court is to consider each provision in relation to all of the 
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. Green River Canal Co. v. 
Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2003). 
In utilizing the above-stated approach, the language above GARY BRACKEN'S 
signature, which reads, "The undersigned agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums 
owed pursuant to this Agreement", means that GARY BRACKEN is personally liable for the 
charges placed on the open account, i.e. the unpaid invoices. No other meaning is allowed to be 
given by some extrinsic evidence. No other meaning gives effect to all the provisions of the 
contract, ignoring none. 
1). The first signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, signed on 
January 26,1999, 
The first signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, signed on January 26, 1999, 
consisted of two pages, and had the signature of Gary Bracken without any additional language. 
Defendant argued that Gary Bracken signed the agreement, only in his representative capacity, 
but, there is no language next to the signature to support this argument. Essentially, Defendant 
relies on the fact that the entity applying for credit is "1 CACHE". (See District Court File, pg. 
83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 2, pg. 121, Hearing Transcript 8:19 -
9:23) 
With regard to the first agreement, which is the controlling agreement because it was 
signed prior to the date any of the invoiced products were delivered, there is clearly no ambiguity 
and the Court is restricted to reading the language of the contract. Thus, the district court erred 
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in not granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and holding that GARY BRACKEN 
was personally liable for the unpaid invoices. 
2). The second signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, signed 
on April 24. 2001. 
Plaintiff established that on April 24, 2001, Defendant GARY R. BRACKEN signed an 
additional agreement called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT" which states: 
"The undersigned agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to 
this Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and 
is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to the 
creditor." ( See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7, pgs. 88, District Court File, pg. 116, 
parag. 3,pg. 123) 
The new credit application signed by Gary Bracken on April 24, 2001, was to replace the 
old one signed on January 26, 1999. According to Mr. GARY BRACKEN'S understanding, 
DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., in April, 2001, DBL Distributing was requiring GARY BRACKEN 
to sign the personal guarantee. (Hearing Transcript, 16:16 - 25). 
On the line for the signature, which starts "by: ", GARY 
BRACKEN signed his name. In the next line over, on the line which says: 
"TITLE: ", GARY BRACKEN, in his own handwriting wrote, 
"PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity". Defendant GARY BRACKEN argued at the 
December 13th hearing that by marking the TITLE line with the words, "PRESIDENT, only in his 
representative capacity", negated the language making the agreement a "personal guarantee" of 
payment. (See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7, pgs. 88, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 
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3,pg. 123) 
The principle question with regard to the April 24th contract is as follows: Does Mr 
BRACKEN negate the personal guarantee with the language, with "PRESIDENT, only in his 
representative capacity"? 
The first question for the court to determine is whether or not the adding of the language, 
"PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity", creates an ambiguity. See Neilsen v. Gold's 
Gym, 78 I ," 3d 600, 602 (I Jtal t 2003); t md Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American Housing 
Partners, Inc., 94 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 2004). If the agreement is unambiguous, the court must 
"determine the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter 
of law." In any even, the court is to consider each pi o v ision it I r i latioi I to all of tl le otliers, w itl: i a 
view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 
11 Jtah 2003). 
It is Plaintiff/Appellant's positioi t that there is i 10 ai i ibigi lit) , and the contract car l be i ead, 
consistently, giving effect to all the language in the contract. The Court should look first within 
the foi I corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties, and should attempt to 
harmonize the provisions in the agreement. Central Florida Investment, Inc. v. Parkwest 
Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah App. 2002). 
In taking this approach, the reasonable interpretation of the language establishes that the 
contract is, really, two agreements. The first agreement is an open account agreement, created 
between DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., and 1 CACHE, L.L.C. For the first agreement, the open 
accoiinf agreement, someone with the appropriate authority to enter contracts on behalf of the 
limited liability company must sign the contract. I In is, the c .onti i ic t reqi tires tl : , ; it the signing 
person state his/her "TITLE". A statement that the signing person has authority to represent 1 
(' • \ < ' 111 I 1 i" is n' 11111 < c • \ I I o 11 >rm the first contract. 
A second contract is formed between DBL DIS' I R IBI J I ING, Inc., and the ' "undersigned" 
who personally guarantees payment of charges placed on the open account. For this second 
contract, the "undersigned" line is controlling, and the "TITLE" line is not relevant to the 
guarantee contract. The TITLE line, only applies to the open account agreement, by the very 
terms of the personal guarantee contract language. 
Furthermore, the plain language of the second contract, the personal guarantee states, 
"This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written 
notice to the creditor." Mr. BRACKEN, clearly, could have provided a definite and unambiguous 
cancellation of the personal guarantee. The plain language of the agreement gives him that 
power. But, Mr. BRACKEN did not provide that written notice canceling the personal 
guarantee, because Mr. BRACKEN was aware that the flow of goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C., 
would have immediately ceased, and he did not want to jeopardize his supply line. 
3). The third signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, was 
signed by AARON BRACKEN on July 18, 2001. 
On or about July 18, 2001, Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed the same agreement 
called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMEN", which Gary Bracken had previously signed. 
(See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 8, pgs. 89, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 3, pg. 125) 
Next to the line which reads, "TITLE", AARON BRACKEN wrote, "Vice President". Next to 
the line which reads, "FIRM NAME", AARON BRACKEN wrote, "1 CACHE". (See District 
Court File, pg. 83, parag. 8, pgs. 89, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 3, pg. 125) 
There is only one meaning to be given to this document and this intention to enter a 
contract. The contract has the effect of making AARON BRACKEN personally liable for the 
charges placed on the open account, i.e. the unpaid invoices, after the date he signed the 
agreement. No other meaning is allowed to be given by some extrinsic evidence. No other 
meaning gives effect to all the provisions of the contract, ignoring none. 
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POINT II: Whether the Utah i ourl ol Appeal should n \crsc Hie i "Ir.iiilticl < "our! < >i<ln 
of January 25, 2005, granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, given that: (1) Plaintiff did plead a 
cause of action; (2) there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants GARY 
BR ACKEN and AARON BRACKEN entered into and breached a personal guarantee eonftuii? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents 
a question of law, which the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal 
Company v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). Summary Judgment is appropriate only if 
thoiv ins been a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King 
International Inc. 17 P.3 1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews 
t!le distilet coiiiIs decision to grant summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district 
court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and mieicih:^ 
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id 
A. Standard for Motion to Dismiss. 
A motion to dismiss, made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) admits the facts alleged in the 
c 11111111 i 111 h 111 challenges the plaintiff s right to relief based on those facts. Russell v. Standard 
Corporation, 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). The affidavits or other evidence is presented in 
conjunction with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the court does not exclude them, 
the motion is generally treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah 
R. of Civ. Proc. DIPT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co. 926 P.2d 835, 839 (I Jtahl996). 
Because disposition of a case by summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
merits, an> • i :)i it t concei iiing questions of fact, including t vidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. Beehive 
1 ; 
Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989). Summary judgment is never 
used to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of 
fact in dispute. Hill ex. rel. Fogle v. Grand Cent.. Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (1970). A genuine issue of 
material fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on 
whether the party opposing the motion, that opposing party's conduct measures up to the 
required standard. Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
B# Facts in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that 1 CACHE, L. C , entered an 
open account agreement. The open account agreement is memorialized on the documents 
attached to the Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibits A, B 
and C. (See District Court File, pgs. 115 - 125). 
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that Defendant GARY R. 
BRACKEN signed the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, consisted 
of two pages, and had the signature of Gary Bracken without any additional language. (See See 
District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 1,2, pg. 120-
121, Hearing Transcript 8:19 - 9:23) 
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that AARON BRACKEN signed 
the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT attached to the Plaintiffs Affidavit as Exhibit C. 
The CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT is the personal guarantee of AARON BRACKEN 
for products ordered, pursuant to the open account agreement, delivered, and invoiced to 1 
CACHE, L.L.C. (See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 8, pgs. 89, District Court File, pg. 116, 
parag. 3, pg. 125) 
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that 1 CACHE, L.L.C. received 
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from Plaintiff, products ordered I >> 1 CACI IE, I .1 . C , ai id < ieli\ c it sd t< 1 C : \Cl IE, I I .C 
Plaintiff further established that 1 CACHE, L.I .C. was invoiced for those goods, and there 
remained outstanding a total unpaid balance owing of $126,345.07, owing since September, 200L 
(District Coi irt File, pg 115 168) 
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that Plaintiff is and was entitled to 
judgment against the personal guarantors GARY R. BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN in the 
amount of $ 126,345.0 / plus court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. (Disti i ::t Cour t File, pg. 
115- 168,parag. 7, 8, 9, and 10) 
But the district court dismissed the case. If the district court properly considered the 
above-described evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, and properly 
resolved those inferences in favor of DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., who opposed Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, the district court should not have granted Defendant GARY BRACKEN'S 
Motion to Dismiss. 
C Law applied in considering Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was erroneous, and this Court should 
reverse that < \-.: oi Dismissal, enter an order directing the district court to deny the Motion to 
dismiss and require that the district court requires Defendants GAR Y BRACKEN and AARON 
BRACKEN to file answers. 
Plaintiffs affidavit in support of Motion for Summary Judgment establishes a prima facie 
case against Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN, which entitles Plaintiff to 
recovery. (District Court File, pg. 1 !.:= 168). 
In this case, the invoices which are summarized on Exhibit D, (File 126 - 168) attached to 
I 
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, (File 115 to 118), and Exhibit 
D, constitute the agreement between the parties. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-201, 202, and 
207. 
Utah Code Section 70A-2-201(2) states: 
"Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract 
and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know 
its contents, it satisfies the requirement of Subsection (1) against such party unless written 
notice of object to its contents is given within ten days after it is received. 
In this case, 1 CACHE, L.L.C., ordered electronic goods, received the electronic goods, 
and was invoiced for those electronic goods. There is no evidence in the record that 1 CACHE, 
L.L.C. ever disputed any of the invoices received. Thus, the price and quantity listed on each 
summarized invoice is the amount due and owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. 
Further, 1 CACHE, L.L.C. received the goods and kept the electronic goods which were 
provided to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Thus, by the conduct of 1 CACHE, L.L.C, an agreement to pay 
for the goods received was established. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-204 and 607. 
Also, there is no dispute that the balance of $126,345.07, was never paid by 1 CACHE, 
L.L.C. and that the balance of $126,345.07 is the amount of the outstanding unpaid balance 
owing to DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., as a result of the invoices summarized on Exhibit D, (File 
126 -168). 
The only issue contested by Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN is 
whether or not they are personally liable for the unpaid invoices of product delivered to 1 
CACHE, L.L.C. 
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D. Personal Guarantee creating a contract between DBL Distributing, Inc., and 
Gary Bracken and Aaron Bracken. 
For the purpose of review on the issue of whether the Court inappropriately granted 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court should ignore the evidence which supports Defendants 
argument. that Defer idants did i lot pei sonall) gi larantee pa> n lents of the open a xoi int, and only 
look at the evidence which establishes or tends to establish that Defendants GARY BRACKEN 
and AARON BRACKEN personally guaranteed payment of the goods received by 1 CACHE, 
L.L.C • fr< >mDBI DIS I R IBI J I IN* 3, Ii M • Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 
827 (Utah App. 1989). 
Under Utah law, an enforceable contract requires a demonstrated mutual assent by the 
paria . mi!e^!:Mi . I b> the tern is \ e agreement. Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. 
Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In this case, GARY BRACKEN signed the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on 
January 2:6, 1999 I he C R EDI I - \ I I ""I IC \ I ION \ GR EEN IEN I c < >nsiste< h >f 1 • • •« > pages w liich 
are attached to the Affidavit of Gary Bracken, Exhibit 1. (See District Court File, pgs. 83, 85-86, 
and. District Court File, pgs. 115-168, Hearing Transcript 8:19 - 9:23). 
Construing all inferences in favor of I 'laintiff, tl le district court, shoi ii i 1 i, ; ;v e concluded that 
by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, GARY 
BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the personal guarantee agreement, which is stated in 
the language immediate lb abo > ' e I""" Ii G \ R "i: BR ACKEN'S signature. As a result, the district 
court should have denied Defendants Motion to Dismiss. 
On or about Jul v IS, JIM! I, Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed the same agreement 
called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT", which Gary Bracken had previously 
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signed. (See District Court File, pgs. 83-84, 89 and District Court File, pgs. 115-168.) 
Construing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the district court should have concluded that 
by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, GARY 
BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the personal guarantee agreement, which is stated in 
the language immediately above Mr. GARY BRACKEN'S signature. As a result, the district 
court should have denied Defendants Motion to Dismiss. 
POINT III: Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's 
Order of January 25, 2005, which, in effect, denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First 
Amended Complaint? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
amend, the appellate court will affirm the denial unless the trial court abused its discretion. 
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development. Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 
1998). 
In this case, Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint was set for 
hearing on December 13, 2005. (District Court File, pg. 196-197) The Court heard some 
argument from counsel concerning the Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. 
(Hearing Transcript, 20:6 -21:14) The district court did not, specifically, rule on Plaintiff 
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint but entered an order which stated: 
"Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case against 1 Cache, LLC, Gary R. Bracken and Aaron 
Bracken is granted." 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to amend. It provides 
that once a party files a responsive pleading, the other "party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when 
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justice so requires." Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273, 1281 (Utah \99S)(quoting Rule 15 of the Utah R. of Civ. Proc). In reviewing a trial 
coi ir t's • ieiiial of a i i ic Ii : i i to ai nend, the appellate • :oi n I: vv ill affirm the denial unless the trial court 
abused its discretion. Id. 
The discretion of a trial judge is not unlimited. I d Outright refusal to grant the leave 
v • ithoi it am - ji istify ing i eason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion, it is merely 
abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the [Utah Rule] . . sic . . Id. 
In this case, the district court did not give any reason for its refusal to grant Plaintiffs 
I\ lotion for I -e a^  > e to I ; ile First \ i nei I :! :::d Complaint, othei •• as granting Defendant's -
Motion to Dismiss as to AARON BRACKEN. The district court's grant of the Motion to 
Dismiss is not a sufficient reason to deny the Motion for Leave to Amend. 
Thus, I Ins 1 'MIIII 'Jh.nl-ii truTM tin1 ilisliit ( l -<*io
 :-- r,<\ Defendants Motion to 
Dismiss with regard to AARON BRACKEN and should remand the case to the district court, 
with instructions that Plaintiff may proceed to file the First Amended Complaint, and pursue the 
action! igainst \ \ R 01 1 BR A CKET J 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
First. ' his l\ »;| K sllatt ;C n u J; i ,11, ill: J I ii h, it I he CR EDI I - \ I 'PI IC A I IOI I AGREEMENT, 
signed by GARY BRACKEN on January 26, 1999, is unambiguous. The plain meaning of the 
contract has the effect of making Defendant GARY BRACKEN personally liable for the unpaid 
invoices < i/i it • • -n ti ic < )j n :n a« ;coi int en sated I ] til : CR EDI I APPLICA I ION AGREEMENT. 
Second, this Appellate Court should hold that the CREDIT APPLICATION 
AGREEMENT, signed by GARY BRACKEN on April 24, 2001, is unambiguous. The plain 
meaning of the conti act has the effect of making Defendant GA R V BR ACKET J personally liable 
for the unpaid invoices due on the open account. 
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Third, this Appellate Court should hold that the CREDIT APPLICATION 
AGREEMENT, signed by AARON BRACKEN on July 18, 2001 is unambiguous. The plain 
meaning of the contract has the effect of making Defendant AARON BRACKEN personally liable 
for the unpaid invoices due on the open account. 
Fourth, this Appellate Court should hold that, construing all inferences in favor of 
Plaintiff, the district court should have concluded that by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION 
AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, GARY BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the 
personal guarantee agreement, which is stated in the language immediately above Mr. GARY 
BRACKEN'S signature. Further, construing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the district court 
should have concluded that by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on July 18, 
2001, AARON BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the personal guarantee agreement, 
which is stated in the language immediately above Mr. AARON BRACKEN'S signature. Thus, 
this Court should reverse the district court's decision to grant Defendants Motion to Dismiss with 
regard to both GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN and should remand the case to the 
district court, with instructions that Plaintiff may proceed to file the First Amended Complaint, 
and pursue the action against both GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN. 
Fifth, this Appellate Court should hold that, as a matter of law, GARY BRACKEN is 
liable for the outstanding invoices which were not paid by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Thus, this Court 
should reverse the district court decision to deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
this Court should remand the case to the district court, with instructions that the district court 
should grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff Appellant DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., against GARY BRACKEN for the sum of 
$126,345.07, plus attorney's fees as requested in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, plus 
interest at the rate of 10 % per year, pursuant to Utah Code Section 15-1-1, starting from 
September 13, 2001, plus court costs incurred. 
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incurred for this appeal. 
1 Plaintiff/Appellant its costs and attorney's fees 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues raised are significant. 
Dated, this if day ot Scptembei, 2005. 
Gregory M. Constantino 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was, this / / day of September, 2005, mailed first 
class, postage-prepaid to: 
Marlin J. Grant 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
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ADDENDUM 
Ml-M< WANINIM I >F DIVISION 
ORDER 
Utah Code § 78-2a-3. 
Utah Code § 78-2-2. 
Utah Code Section 70A-2-101. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-607. 
tali t ode Ann. § 15-1-1. 
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A 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
DBL DISTRIBUTING, INC, a Corporation, * 
Plaintiff, * 
* MEMORANDUM DECISION 
v, * 
1 CACHE, LX.C, a Utah Limited Liability * 
Company, and GARY R, BRACKEN, an * 
individual, + 
* Case No: 040101608 MI 
Defendants, + 
This matter is before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
Plainiiffaiul a Motion to Diinniss filed by the D 
issue relative to I CACHE, L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company, which has been 
discharged in bankruptcy. The Motion to Dismiss asks not only the action be dismissed against 1 
CACHE, LX.C, because ofthebaakniptcy stay, but also 
defending this action since the automatic stay should have prevented the action being filed 
against said entity. 
The balance of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendant is based upon the language 
ofthe documents attached to ttie pleadings described as cre^ 
two which are germane to this action; one, prepared in April, 2001, and a previous like document 
prepared in January, 1999. The operative language in those documents reflect the application for 
credit is being made by 1 CACHE LX.C and no other persons. In the 1999 document, the 
language which is salient to this motion is that *The undereigned agrees to unconditionally 
guarantee payment of all sum* owed pursuant to ft is Agreemem and further agrees to its term$ 
regarding venue. This is intended ^  j v? 
m 
except by written notice to creditor.*' 
In the 2001 credit application, the language has been changed to read 'The undrsigned 
agrees to personalty gam&tet payment of all sums awed pursuant to this Agreement and further 
agrees to the terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and 
shall not be revoked except by written notice to creditor." The major change is the wend 
"personally" guarantee. Again in the 2001 application, the entity seeking credit in the application 
is 1 CACHE, L.L.C.. with Gary Bracken, Aaron Bracken and Richard Bracken named as 
proprietors, partners or officers. It should be noted first the that applications arc documents of the 
Plaintiff, created by the Plaintiff and filled out apparently by the Defendants or at least signed by 
the Defendants. 
The curious tiring about the language is tot there is no distinction in the langiag^ 
between customer information, credit application and personal guarantee. In other words, the 
personal guarantee, at least in the 2001 document, does not reflect a personal guarantee of 
someone else's obligation. It appears to be a personal obligation by 1 CACHE L.L.C. of the 
credit extended to it which is a result of the agreement, There is no signature line for the parties 
except that at the bottom of the page and not inside the ''guarantee box/' The focus language is 
part of the language found within a box referencing the parties to the agreement, evidenced by 
the beginning language ". . . we herein make application to DBL Distributing, Inc.,.." There is 
not separate language from that above quoted referencing other parties such as third party 
guarentees. 
The Plaintiff would have the Court hold that the guarantee m the 1999 as well as the 2001 
documents exposed the signer thereof to guarantee the payment of any credit extended as a result 
of the agreement. But as to the 1999 document these is no question that ttie customer there w«g 1 
CACHE LX.C ^  and it was not the Defendant Gary Bracken or any other individual. There is 
little question from reading the document that the signature thereon was on behalf of 1 CACHJE 
L.L,C, and there is no personal guarantee* only guaranteed by the customer 
With respect to the 2001 document, two of which exists, one dated 3/22/2001 and one: 
dated 4/24/2001, the former unsigned by an individual and the latterbdng signed by Defodaiit 
x°° 
Gary Bracken but as president in a representative capacity. Again the credit application is by 
CACHE U L G The personal guarantee language there, it couid be argued that it is more 
operative against a signatory in addition to the customer, but in this case there is an exception* 
made by the signer as president in his representative eapadty. The s e e ^ 
document signed by one Aaron Bracken, vice-president- The Plaintiff cites no law in its favor 
relative to the construction of these two documents but the Court notes the law cited by the 
Defendant as well as generally accepted construction principles would consider that the 
documents wore created by the Plaintiff, the language thereof is the Plaintiffs language, the 
customer is 1 CACHE L.L.C., there is no provision for liability on behalf of anyone else and the 
signatories were in their representative capacities on bdialf of 1 CACHE LL.C.whick 
guaranteed payment. 
The Court is satisfied that the language within the four corners of the contract, (excluding 
parole evidence as there is not an ambiguity created and if there was, it was created by die 
Plaintiff] should be construed against Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
With respect to the claim by the Defendants of costs and attorney's fees incurred on 
behalf of the discharged debtor, if such a claintexists, they must be brought by either the 
bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy estate or the Court must be shown in feet that 
right on obligation to defend that action is in the Defemteits, Othawised^rewasnoobUgatito 
to defend that action since there is already a banlruptcy aiui therefore no a^ 
and costs will be granted. Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a formal order in 
^ ^ 
conformance herewith. + 
Dated this ? day of I 
BY THE COURT 
&t 
B 
OLSON ft HOOGAN. P C 
SB Wesr CKMTCM 
* .o. fto* B2S 
LOGAN. UTAH *4a2*O02B 
(43&}7B2*1SS1 
TOEMONTON OFFICE. 
I Z 3 C M T N M M 
P.O. aox 1 t f l 
TRCMONTON, MTAM 84937 
teas* asr-aoBB 
Mariinl Grant (#4581) 
OLSON &HOGGAN,P.C 
[Attorneys for Defendants 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
JLogan, Utah 84321 
[Telephone: (435)752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF UTAH, WAND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 




jl CACHE, L.L.C., a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, and GARY R. 
BRACKEN, an individual, and AARON 
(BRACKEN, an individual 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 040101608 MI 
This matter came before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
[Plaintiff and a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
bought to enforce the credit applications. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss argued that there was no 
personal liability for the individual's in the company and the individuals signed in there 
[representative capacity, thus avoiding any personal liability. Defendants also argued that 1 Cache, 
BLLC had filed bankruptcy and was not a proper party to this action. The Court having reviewed die 
(pleadings and briefs filed by both counsels now orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case against 1 Cache, LLC, Gary JL Bracken and 
(Aaron Bracken is granted. 
3. Defendants' have sought attorney fees necessitated to argue and defend 1 Cache, LLC 
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against the violation of the bankruptcy stay. If such a claim exists, the Court orders the Defendant 
no seek those costs through the bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. There may 
pave been no obligation to defend 1 Cache, LLC inasmuch as there had already been a bankruptcy. 
[Therefore, no attorney fees or costs will be awarded at least in this Court. 
4. This Order is based on a Memorandum Decision issued by the Court on the 7th day 
(of January, 2005, which sets forth the findings and the reasons for the Order and is incorporated 
herein. 
DATED t*£f day of January, 2005. 
j S ^ f ^ V i ^ p E COURT. 
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RULE 7f IM21 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 7(fX2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to this Order is 
jsubraitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after service, the original will be filed with 
(the Court for signature. 
J hereby certify that on the \0_ day ofJanuary, 2 0051 mailed an exact copy of i))e foregoing 
ORDER to the following: 
Gregory M. Constantino 
68 South Main Street, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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78-2a-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
m Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L Rev 150 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election held 
more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, 
the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences 
on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge 
whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until a 
successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of 
Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L, 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decisis. panels of that court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank. Renn v Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involv- R2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
mg the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
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(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any mat ter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enac ted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch . 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, ^ 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch. 255, 
§ 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend-
ment by ch. 255, effective April 30, 2001, added 
"parent-time" in Subsection (2)(h). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 302, effective 
April 30, 2001, inserted "or charge" in Subsec-
tion (2)(e) and made stylistic changes. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16. 
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(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a 
vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until 
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is 
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme 
Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of 
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall 
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent 
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief 
justice as consistent with law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Membership on board of control of s tate law 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, library, § 9-7-301. 
ch. 47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, § 78-7-
§ 4. 21. 
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art. 
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2. VIII, Sec. 7. 
Disqualification in particular case, Utah Retirement, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 15; 
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2. Title 49, Chapters 17 and 18; §§ 78-8-103, 
Judicial nomination and selection, Title 20A, 78-8-104. 
Chapter 12. Salary, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Death Qualifi- Am. Jur. 2d, — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 67, 
cation and the Right to an Impartial Jury 68. 
Under the State Constitution: Capital Ju ry C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A 
Selection in Utah After State v. Young, 1995 C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
Utah L. Rev. 365. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981, 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, 
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effec-
§ 4. tive July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a 
first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enac ted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, $ 1; 1992, ch . 127, 
§ 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5; 
1995, ch. 299, § 46; 1996, ch. 159, § 18; 2001, 
ch. 302, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws 
1986, ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as 
enacted by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to 
original appellate jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court, and enacts the above section. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend-
ment, effective April 30, 2001, inserted "or 
charge" in Subsection (3)(i) and made stylistic 
changes. 
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Chief justice to pre-
side over impeachment of governor, § 77-5-2. 
Election contest appeals, §§ 20A-4-406, 
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII, 
Sec. 3; U.R.C.R 65B Utah R. App. R 19. 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3. 
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Section 
70A-2-715. Buyer's incidental and conse-
quential damages. 
70A-2-716. Buyer's right to specific perfor-
mance or replevin. 
70A-2-717. Deduction of damages from the 
price. 
70A-2-718. Liquidation or limitation of 
damages — Deposits. 
70A-2-719. Contractual modification or 
limitation of remedy. 
70A-2-720. Effect of "cancellation" or "re-
scission" on claims for ante-
cedent breach. 
70A-2-721. Remedies for fraud. 
70A-2-722. Who can sue third parties for 
injury to goods. 
70A-2-723. Proof of market price — Time 
and place. 
70A-2-724. Admissibility of market quota-
tions. 
Section 
70A-2-725. Statute of limitations in con-
tracts for sale. 
Part 8 












nology — Remedies. 
Refunds — Computation — Pro-
hibition of enforcement of 
lease against consumer. 
Resale or release of returned 
assistive technology — Prohi-
bition. 
Consumer may not waive rights 
under chapter — Enforce-
ment — Remedies not exclu-
PARTI 
SHORT TITLE, GENERAL CONSTRUCTION AND 
SUBJECT MATTER 
70A-2-101- Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code 
— Sales. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-101. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Uniform Com-
mercial Code in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 904. 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of UCC 
A r t 2, dealing with sales, 17 AX.R.3d 1010. 
70A-2-102. Scope — Certain security and other transac-
tions excluded from this chapter. 
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions in 
goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an 
unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a 
security transaction nor does this chapter impair or repeal any statute 
regulating sales to consumers, fanners or other specified classes of buyers. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-102. 
Cross-References. — Secured transactions, 
Title 70A, Chapter 9a. 
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thereto but not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract 
for the sale of goods within this chapter whether the subject matter is to be 
severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at 
the time of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present 
sale before severance. 
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third-party rights 
provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be 
executed and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and shall 
then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract 
for sale. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-107; 1977, 
ch. 272, § 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Sand and gravel. by the UCC. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Kasler 
A contract to provide sand, gravel, and aggre- Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Utah 1994). 
gate is a contract for the sale of goods, governed 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 77A C.J.S. Sales § 15. 
PART 2 
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF 
CONTRACT 
70A-2-201. Formal requ i rements — Statute of frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of 
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not 
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the 
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods 
shown in such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation 
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party 
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of 
Subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its 
contents is given within ten days after it is received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection CI) but 
which is valid in other respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are 
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business 
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circum-
stances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has 
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments 
for their procurement: or 
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(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits m his 
pleading, test imor^ or otherwise in court tha t a contract for sale was 
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the 
quantity of goods admitted, or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and 
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606) 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, *} 2-201. Statute of frauds generally, Title 25, Chapter 
Cross-References. — Price payable in 5 
money, goods, realty, or otherwise ^ 70A-2-
304 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Acceptance and receipt of goods 
Admission of contract's existence 
Application 
"Between merchants" exception 
Confirmatory memorandum 
Contract for work 
Definitions 
Modification of contract 
Par t performance 
Pleading statute 




Sufficiency of memorandum or writing 
Acceptance and receipt of goods . 
It is a question for jury to determine whether 
or not defendant is to be deemed to have 
accepted the goods by his failure to reject them 
within a reasonable time Lauer v Richmond 
Coop Mercantile I n s t , 8 Utah 305, 31 P 397 
(1892) (decided under former law) 
Either words or conduct may be sufficient to 
show acceptance of goods although the infer-
ence to be drawn from either should be clear 
and unequivocal James Mack Co v Bear River 
Milling Co , 63 Utah 565, 227 P 1033, 36 A L R 
643 (1924) (decided under former law) 
Manual and actual receipt of the goods is not 
required, symbolic, constructive, or implied 
possession is sufficient Hudson Furn Co v 
Freed Furn & Carpet Co , 10 Utah 31,36 P 132 
(1894) (decided under former law) 
Admiss ion of contract's ex i s tence . 
Admission by party to a transaction between 
a merchant and a nonmerchant tha t he would 
have considered himself bound by their oral 
agreement if he had received confirmation of it 
within a reasonable time did not bring into 
operation the provisions of Subsection (3 Kb) 
and validate the otherwise unenforceable 
agreement Lish v Compton, 547 P2d 223 
(Utah 1976) 
Court must examine the total posture of a 
party s defense to determine whether the party 
admitted the existence of a contract under this 
section and, where party denied tha t a contract 
existed, whether his s ta tements as to the price 
and method of payment discussed and his use 
of the term "contract price" amounted only to a 
s ta tement of negotiations for a contract 
Rmderknecht v Luck, 965 P2d 564 (Utah Ct 
App 1998) 
Application. 
Where buyer was m possession of wheat as 
bailee and after oral contract for sale thereof 
was entered into he requested extension of t ime 
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of 
s ta tute of frauds James Mack Co v Bear River 
Milling Co , 63 Utah 565, 227 P 1033, 36 A L R 
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uni-
form Commercial Code) 
Because amount involved in oral contract for 
sale of turkey poults was in excess of $500, plea 
of statute of frauds precluded its enforcement 
Tanner v Childers, 108 Utah 455, 160 P2d 965 
(1945) (decided under former law). 
"Between merchants" except ion . 
Since a farmer, par ty to a transaction with a 
gram dealer, was not a "merchant" within the 
meaning of this section, Subsection (2) did not 
apply and the s tatute of frauds rendered unen-
forceable an oral agreement to sell the farmer's 
whole wheat crop, valued substantially m ex-
cess of $500 Lish v Compton, 547 P2d 223 
(Utah 1976) 
Where buyer was m possession of wheat as 
bailee and after oral contract for sale thereof 
was entered into he requested extension of time 
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of 
s tatute of frauds James Mack Co v Bear River 
Milling Co , 63 Utah 565, 227 P 1033, 36 A L R 
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uni-
form Commercial Code) 
Confirmatory memorandum. 
Where two elephant merchants agreed over 




notwithstanding statute of frauds with respect Construction of s tatute of frauds exception 
to goods for which payment has been made and under UCC § 2-201(2) for confirmatory writing-
accepted or which have been received and ac- between merchants, 82 A.L.R.4th 709. 
cepted, 97 A.L.R.3d 908. 
70A-2-202. Final wri t ten expression — Parol or extrinsic 
evidence. 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties 
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as 
a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included 
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of t rade (Section 70A-1-205) or by 
course of performance (Section 70A-2-208); and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the 
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement 
of the terms of the agreement. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-202. 
Cross-References. — Exclusion or modifi-
cation of warranties, § 70A-2-316. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
pertaining to quantity and dimension. Durbano 
Finality of written expression. Metals, Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., 574 
Sales tax payment. p 2 d 1159 (Utah 1978). 
Finality of wr i t ten express ion. Sales t a x payment . 
Where parties orally agreed to sale of certain Prime contractor did not succeed in placing 
used railroad materials, purchaser sent seller burden of paying sales taxes on materialman 
purchase order containing specifications for the by showing trade usage or course of dealing 
materials, seller signed the order, after inspect- where record showed the parties were not en-
ing the track purchaser sent new purchase gaged in the same trade or business and that 
orders with different specifications, seller nei- the custom varied from trade to trade, and 
ther signed nor objected to the new orders, and where the evidence of a previous transaction by 
purchaser accepted materials not conforming to the parties was not conclusive. Ralph Child 
any of the orders, the purchase orders were Constr. Co. v. United States, 365 F.2d 841 (10th 
clearly not intended by the parties to be a Cir. 1966). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Teaching of UCC § 2-202 where fraud or misrepresenta-
Paroi Evidence, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 647. tion is claimed in sale of goods, 71 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 74 to 1059. 
79- Affirmations or representations made after 
C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 910; 77A sale is closed as basis of warranty under UCC 
C.J.S. Sales §§ 82 to 85. § 2-313(l)(a), 47 A.L.R.4th 200. 
A.L.R. — Application of parol evidence rule 
70A-2-203. Seals inoperat ive. 
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for sale or an offer to 
buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing a sealed instrument and the 
41 
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law wi tli respec t to s ealed ins t n iiii en ts does no t apply to si ich a con tract or 
offer 
His to ry : L. 1965, eii. 154, ss 2-203. 
REFERENCES 
Am, J u r . 2d. 6'J A... J .:. Jil Sulcs ^ 105, 
106. 
70A-12-1204. Formation ui gei ieial . 
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any mariner sufficient to 
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of such a contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract tor salt- •;; .> • -1 
even though the moment of its making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not 
fail for indeiiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there 
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy 
His tory : L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-204. uconscionable contract or clause, § 70A-2-
Cross -References , — Open terms, §§ 70A- 3012. 
2-305 to 70A-2-311. 
Supplementary general principles of law ap-
plicable, § 70A-M03. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANAI YSIS by the dealer's sales manager and the buyer, 
after failing to agree to a suggested financing 
ije lvery. plan, gave the dealer a check on j /hich he wrote 
Failure for indeiiniteness.
 t h a t t h e c h e c k w a s t o b e h e l ^ n t i l t h e b u y e r 
u n
 " secured a loan for the amount and then stopped 
Delivery. payment on the check the next day, the parties 
View that contract to be valid and enforce- failed to complete a contract since there was no 
able had to have been delivered was a mistaken definite meeting of the minds. J. Golden Barton 
view of the law since delivery is not necessary Motor Co. v. Jackson, 9 Utah 2d 210, 341 P.2d 
in the absence of an express intention. 423 (1959) (decided under former law). 
Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 
456 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1972). Not found . 
Contract not formed under this section. See 
„ „ ,, . . , , J I n Herm Hughes & Sons v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582 
Where the original order signed by the pro- ,TJ, , p , * 1999) 
F a i l u r e for indef in i teness . 
Where the original order s 
spective buyer of an automobile was changed 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am J u r . 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 35. 
C.J .S. — 77A C.J.S. Sales §§ 2, 9, 29 et seq, 
70A-2-205 I' ii m offers. 
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its 
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of 
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable 
42 
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7OA-2-207 • Additional te rms in acceptance or confirma-
tion. 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confir-
mation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even 
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed 
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the 
additional or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given 
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received, 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is 
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do 
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular 
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, 
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of this act. 
• History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-207. 
Cross-References. — Acceptance of goods 
by buyer, effect, § 70A-2-607. 
Adequate assurance of performance, right to, 
§ 70A-2-609. 
Contractual modification or limitation of 
remedy, § 70A-2-719. 
NOTFSTO DECISIONS 
(2Kb) and thus did not become effective by 
virtue of offeror's silence as to the added provi-
sion; seller could not recover attorney fees in 
subsequent action on open account. Johnson 
Tire Serv., Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521 
(Utah 1980). 
Ci ted in Herm Hughes & Sons v, Quintek, 
834 R2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Northwestern Un ive r s i ty L a w Review C.J.S. — 77A C.J.S. Sales §§ 2, 9. 
— Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 A.L.R. — What are additional terms materi-
and the "Counter Offer"; Acceptance Unlim- ally altering contract within meaning of UCC 
ited?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 677. $ 2-207(2Xb>, 72 A.L.R.3d 479. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales $§ 153 
to 174. 
70A-2-208 COHI'NU of performance or practical construc-
tion. 
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance 
by either party with knowledge of the natiire of the nprfn rmance and oppor-
Installment contracts, § 70A-2-612. 
Liquidation or limitation of damages, § 70A-
2-718. —-
'Transactions between merchants/ ' § 70A-2-
104. / 






Addition to the sales receipt (treated by par-
ties as an "acceptance or a written confirma-
tion") of a provision for attorney fees materially 
altered the offer within meaning of Subsection 
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His tory : L. 1965, ch . 154, § 2-606. 
Cross -References . — Passing of title, res-
ervation for security, § 70A-2-401. 
Risk of loss, effect of breach of contract, 
§ 70A-2-510. 





Sufficiency of acts of acceptance. 
Sufficiency of findings of fact. 
—Acts of acceptance. 
Cited. 
A c c e p t a n c e . 
Buyer of mobile home couid not recover for 
breach of implied warranty of fitness after 
living in mobile home for two years. Chrysler 
Credit Corp. v. Bums, 527 P.2d 655 (Utah 
1974). 
Sufficiency of a c t s of a c c e p t a n c e . 
In action to recover purchase price of carload 
of rice, which was sold by sample without 
express warranty, where right of inspection 
was intended as condition precedent to passing 
of title, it was held that buyer did not accept 
rice by removing it from car to make inspection. 
Wall Rice Milling Co. v. Continental Supply Co., 
36 Utah 121, 103 P. 242, 140 Am. S t R. 815 
(1909) (decided under prior law). 
Where purchaser of stoves placed advertise-
ment in newspapers offering stoves for sale and 
naming dates upon which demonstrations 
would be made, executed trade acceptance for 
purchase price, and sent letter to seller that it 
was attempting to settle for stoves and would 
pay for them as soon as sold, his acts consti-
tuted acceptance within meaning of former 
§ 60-3-8. Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. Farmers ' 
Cash Union, 61 Utah 567, 216 P. 1075 (1923). 
Taking possession of goods is not determina-
tive of acceptance, nor is signing a form accep-
tance before receipt of the goods, nor making of 
lease payment. Colonial Pac. leasing Corp. v. 
J.W.C.J.R. Corp., 1999 UT App fel, 977 P.2d 
541. 
Sufficiency of f indings of fact 
—Acts of a c c e p t a n c e . 
Where the trial judge failed to make findings 
of fact on whether the defendant had a reason-
able opportunity to inspect a computer and 
software package, or whether it accepted the 
goods, and where the facts were disputed, the 
error was not harmless; reversal and remand 
for further findings was necessary. Colonial 
Pac. Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C. J.R. Corp., 1999 UT 
App 91, 977 P.2d 541. 
Cited in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Easier Corp., 
855 P. Supp. 1560 (D. Utah 1994) ^ 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 623 et 




 R. — Use of goods by buyer as constitut-
• reptance under UCC § 2-606(lXc), 67 
A.L.R.3d 363. 
70A -2-607. Effect of acceptance Notice of breach 
Burden of establishing breach after acceptance 
— Notice of claim or litigation to person answer-
able over, 
(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted. 
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods 
accepted and if made with knowledge of a nonconformity cannot be revoked 
because of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the 
nonconformity would be seasonably cured but acceptance does not of itself 
impair any other remedy provided by this chapter for nonconformity. 
(3) Where a tender has been accepted 
84 
SALES 70A-2-607 
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should 
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from 
any remedy; and 
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (Subsection (3) of 
Section 70A-2-312) and the buyer is sued as a result of such a breach he 
m u s t so notify the seller within a reasonable time after he receives notice 
of the litigation or be barred from any remedy over for liability established 
by the litigation. 
(4) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the 
goods accepted. 
(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for 
which his seller is answerable over 
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If the notice 
states tha t the seller may come in and defend and that if the seller does 
not do so he will be bound in any action against him by Ins buyer by any 
determination of fact common to the two litigations, then unless the seller 
after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and defend he is so 
bound. 
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (Subsection (3) of 
Section 70A-2-312) the original seller may demand in writing that his 
buyer tu rn over to him control of the litigation including settlement or else 
be barred from any remedy over and if he also agrees to bear all expense 
and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then unless the buyer after season-
able receipt of the demand does turn over control the buyer is so barred. 
(6) The provisions of Subsection (3), (4) and (5) apply to any obligation of a 
buyer to hold the seller harmless against infringement or the like (Subsection 
(3) of Section 70A-2-312). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-607. 
Cross-References . — Deduction of dam-
ages from the price, § 70A-2-717. 







General engineering contractor's failure to 
reject goods (aggregate for making concrete) 
and its use of the aggregate on a construction 
project resulted in an acceptance of the aggre-
gate, barring contractor's breach of contract 
claim for nonconforming goods. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Kasler Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1560 (D. 
Utah 1994). 
"Reasonable t ime . " 
When purchasers of a motor home, upon 
finding a number of defects in the vehicle, 
sought to rescind the contract the day after it 
Notice and notification, § 70A-1-20K26). 
Performance or acceptance under reservation 
of rights, § 70A-1-207. 
Reasonable time, § 70A-1-204. 
was entered, but were persuaded by the seller 
to keep the vehicle and take it on a planned trip 
to California, during which time the already 
noted problems persisted and new ones became 
manifest so that the day after they returned 
home purchasers again attempted rescission, 
they acted within a "reasonable time" within 
the meaning of this section. Christopher v. 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 R2d 1009 (Utah 
1976). 
Unreasonable t ime. 
Notification to seller tha t it may have 
breached warranties six years after tender of 
delivery of concrete construction aggregates 
and after buyer, general engineering contrac-
tor, should have discovered the breach was not, 
as a mat ter of law, "within a reasonable time." 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Kasler Corp., 855 F. 
Supp. 1560 (D. Utah 1994). 
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2. Legal Capacity of Children. 
3. Interparty Agreements. 
4. Joint Obligations. 
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed], 
6. Prompt Payment Act. 
7. Registered Public Obligations Act. 
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act. 




15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — 
Legal rate. 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 
Section 
15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed. 
lo-i i. in te res t r a t e s — C o n t r a c t e d r a t e •••- Lega l r a t e . 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the 
subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose 
in action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any 
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or 
to any contract or obligations made before May 1 4 1 981 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; CX. 1907, 
§ 1241; CX. J 917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; 
L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, 
ch. 73, § I; 1985, ch. 159, $ 6; 1989, ch. 79, 
$ 1. 
Cross-References. — Payment of interest 
as extending s tatute of limitations, $ 78-12-44. 
Rate where unspecified in instrument, § 70 A-
3-118. 
Time from which interest runs, § 70A-3-112. 
Utah Consumer Credit Code, ss 70C-1-101 et 
seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amount of award. 
Damages for breach of contract. 
Debts overdue. 
Determination of damages. 
Determining interest rate. 
Eminent domain. 
Federal court. 
— Federal question. 
Installments. 
